Hugh White’s review of David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla (“Turning a Mouse into an Elephant”, May 2009) ends with a comment on the author’s character: “David Kilcullen seems to find something a little intoxicating about the image of the soldier–scholar out among the world’s wild peoples, leading them to serve his own country’s interests … to write ‘my will across the sky in stars,’ as Lawrence said.” White’s point is reinforced by the full-page picture that accompanies the article: Peter O’Toole in front of a sketch of Lawrence in Arab headdress. Yet there is nothing in Kilcullen’s book that suggests a scholarly egomaniac writing his will among the world’s wild peoples and subordinating them to the United States’ will. Instead, there is much that expresses respect and humane concern for the wellbeing of the Iraqis, Afghans and other peoples whose lives have been damaged by the conflict.

It seems to me that the motivation for David Kilcullen’s involvement with the Americans has been a judgment that the invasion was, as he says in The Accidental Guerrilla, “an extremely serious strategic error”, a perception that US fighting methods were causing a lot of collateral damage and provoking further conflict, and a belief that lives could be saved and peace eventually restored by the adoption of a better strategy. To most people these ideas sound like simple common sense; many in the American military were already thinking along similar lines; but the Bush administration was slow to accept the need for a change of direction. One of the claims made several times in the book is that the change of strategy under the leadership of General Petraeus saved “tens of thousands of Iraqi lives”. The claim may be disputed, but it corresponds with my understanding of the humanitarian motivation of the members of the Petraeus team.

The main body of the review criticises various alleged “confusions and equivocations”. “So which is it: are we there to help them, or to protect ourselves?” Obvious answer: both. Similarly with the reviewer’s other instances. Is Al Qaeda a serious global threat, or does it become a threat only if the West reacts unwisely? Answer: both. It is a serious threat because the West has already reacted unwisely and will probably do so in future; and Al Qaeda is skilled at provoking such reactions. Should the West stay out or intervene to protect the local population? Answer: generally stay out, but if for some reason (“by error or necessity”) the armed forces of Western countries get involved, their main effort must be to protect the local population. Does the West need a global strategy against Al Qaeda or should it respond to local situations separately? Answer: it needs a global strategy for guidance in deciding which local situations to respond to and how to respond; such a strategy is outlined in chapter five of the book.

The last sentence of the review, “… outsiders have almost no capacity to shape other societies’ political systems and social structures, and often do more harm than good when they try”, in fact echoes one of the themes of the book: “We should avoid such interventions wherever possible, simply because the costs are so high and the benefits so doubtful”. There is much more to the same effect.

(Note: David Kilcullen is my son. This is my response, not his.)